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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Appellate Division, Second Department, 3 which states in part that a
general preference may be obtained provided "[t]hat the venue of the
action was properly laid in the county in which it is pending, within
the requirements of the CPLR... ."87 In so holding, the court found
that the plaintiffs' choice of venue, Westchester County, was improper
under CPLR 503(a) unless the action was jurisdictionally required to
be tried there, 38 since Westchester was not the county where one of
the parties resided at the time of the commencement of the action. The
court further noted that this finding was not impeded by the defen-
dants' failure to oppose the motion or the failure by any of the parties
to request a change in venue.3 9
This decision implements the court's inherent power to control its
calendar, 140 the cited appellate division rule, and the inconvenient
forum policy.141 "[W]here, as here, one or more of the parties reside in
a county in the State the venue preference requirement is singularly
applicable and the preference must be sought in the county in which
one of the parties resides."'142
AiTiCLE 41 - TgiAL BY A JURY
CPLR 4102: Validity of jury waiver clause in lease upheld in action
sounding in contract.
Prior to the 1965 enactment of section 259-c of the Real Property
Law, courts frequently upheld lease provisions in which the right to a
jury trial was waived by the contracting parties. 148 Section 259-c limits
the efficacy of such clauses by invalidating a jury trial waiver "in any
action for personal injury or property damage."'" Recently, however,
in Lindenwood Realty Co. v. Feldman,145 the Appellate Division,
186 22 NYCRR 674.1(a) (actions for damages for permanent disability or death).
187 72 Misc. 2d at 380, 339 N.YS.2d at 400.
188 Id. at 379, 39 N.Y.S2d at 899.
39 Id., 339 N.Y.S.2d at 398-99, citing Carbide & Carbon Chems. Co. v. Northwest
Exterm. Co., 207 Misc. 548, 139 N.YS.2d 480 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1955).
14o See 4 WK&M 3403.02.
141 See Asaro v. Audio by Zimet, Inc., 69 Misc. 2d 316, 330 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Dist. Ct.
Suffolk County 1972) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L REV. 148,
161 (1972); Suriano v. Hosie, 59 Misc. 2d 973, 302 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County
1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JoHN's L, REV. 532, 588 (1970).
142 72 Misc. 2d at 380, 339 N.YS.2d at 399.
143 Lease waiver provisions have been strictly construed, however, and limited to
actions seeking to enforce rights originating under the lease. See 14 CARMODY-WAT 2d,§ 90:262, at 211 (1967); 4 WK&M 4102.14. See geneally 3 J. RAsCH, LANDLoan AND TENArT
§ 1344 (2d ed. 1971).
144 N.Y. REAL Pnop. LAw § 259-c (McKinney 1968).
'45 40 App. Div. 2d 855, 38 N.YS.2d 245 (2d Dep't 1972), rev'g mem. 72 Misc. 2d 68,
388 N.Y.S.2d 243 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1971).
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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
Second Department, strictly construed section 259-c to uphold the
validity of a broad jury waiver provision in a lease.Therein, a landlord sued its tenants to recover for rent and prop-
erty damage to the leased premises. The appellate term held that sec-
tion 259-c precluded the landlord from invoking a jury waiver
provision in the lease to negate the tenants' demand for a jury trial.
The dissent, however, maintained that the words "personal injury or
property damage" within the section "traditionally . . . refer to tort
actions arising out of a liability imposed by law for negligence, or even
a willful tort, but not out of a contract." 148 This and its view of section
259-c as "a companion section to"147 section 5-321 of the General Obli-
gations Law,148 which invalidates an agreement exempting a lessor from
liability for "injuries to person or property" caused by his negligence,
led the dissent to conclude that the waiver provision in this instance
was valid.
When the Second Department reversed the appellate term in a
memorandum decision, it adopted the reasoning of the dissent in the
lower court.149
CPLR 4110: Two-year delay in challenging impartiality of jurors,
while awaiting review of favorable verdict, will preclude assertion of
such claim.
Since parties to a civil action are entitled to have their case
presented before an impartial jury, CPLR 4110 enumerates various
grounds for challenging a prospective juror for cause. 150 If, after the
verdict, it becomes apparent that circumstances existed which would
have been grounds for exclusion of a juror before trial, a court may
set the verdict aside.151 Once his particular interest is demonstrated,
whether the juror would decide the case objectively becomes a ques-
tion-of fact for the court provided that a prima facie disqualification
does not exist.152
146 72 Misc. 2d at 69, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 244 (Gulotta, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 70, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
148 N.Y. GmN. OBuG. LAw § 5-321 (McKinney 1964).
149 But see Swinger Realty Corp. v. A.S. Kizner Imports, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 742, 335
N.Y.S.2d 108 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1972) (per curiam); 4 WK&M 4102.14.
150 CPLR 4110 does not exclude common-law grounds for such a challenge. See 7B
McKINNEY's CPLR 4110, commentary at 138 (1963); 4 WK&M 4110.07.
151 Knickerbocker v. Erie R.R., 247 App. Div. 495, 286 N.YS. 1001 (4th Dep't 1936) (per
curiam).
152See 4 WK&M 4110.02, 4110.09. CPLR 4110(b) provides that a relationship
"within the sixth degree by consanguinity or affinity to a party" automatically disqualifies
a juror.
